Technische Universität Berlin

Social health insurance systems: Where are they coming from and where are they going (particularly for chronically ill)?

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- Social health insurance countries in western Europe
- Central and eastern Europe (Semashko to SHI)
- Tax-based systems in western Europe



What makes a health system a SHI system?

Contribution collector

Third-party payer

= sickness funds

bipartite self-government

Not (health) risk-, but usually wage-based contribution

Limited government control

Contracts

Free access

Population

Mandatory insurance

Providers

Public-private mix

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



- One national monopoly fund
- Several regional monopoly funds
- Several monopoly funds organised on other principles (e.g. occupation): Austria, France, Luxembourg, Germany (-1995) and the Netherlands (-1992)
- Several funds in competition: Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland



Number of sickness funds

	A*	B*	CH	D*	F*	L*	NL
1992	26	127	191	1223	19	9	27
2002	24	100	93	355	18	9	24

* typical bi-partite government

Funds do not cover entire geographical areas!



- SHI tradionally tied to employment
- later extended to defined other groups (dependents, pensioners, unemployed, students, self-employed etc.)
- no exclusion due to health status, but
- notion of “universal coverage“
  = very recent phenomenon



- 100% population coverage de facto in Austria and Luxembourg, legally in Belgium (since 1998), France (since 2000) and Switzerland (since 1996)
- 75% mandatory and 13% voluntary coverage in Germany (choice between SHI and PHI)
- 65% coverage in Netherlands (no choice!)



- Issue 1 – Choice: *pre-determined* membership in Austria, France and Luxembourg; *free choice* of fund in Belgium, Netherlands (1993-), Germany (1996-) and Switzerland - *the young, well-educated and healthier are changing funds more often, i.e. risk-structure de-mixes!*



- Issue 2 – Benefits included: traditionally focused on acute care,
  partly extended to *preventive services* (mostly individual, problems with collective services!)
  and extension to *long-term care* e.g. in Germany from 1994 (through separate social insurance)



- Traditionally based on wages only (and with an upper limit)
- Problem 1: increasing burden on labour costs as other income is rising faster
- Solution: broaden income base, i.e. abolish upper limit, in France change from wage-based contribution of 8.9% to tax of 8.25% on all income of insured + taxing of pharamaceutical advertising ...



- Problem 2: inequity of contributions as risk profiles differ between funds
- Traditional approach: complete pooling of contributions, i.e. funds are reimbursed from pool according to expenditure
- = conflict with efficiency goal and instrument “competition“
- Currently: *uniform* contribution rate in Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Netherlands (but differing per-capita premium on top); *differing* rate in Germany; *differing* per-capita premium in Switzerland



- new approach: prospective allocation of resources (Belgium, Netherlands) or re-allocation (Germany, Switzerland) *– the latter is more difficult as sickness funds view money as "theirs"*
- differences in: area of allocation - nation vs. region (Switzerland), degree of retrospective compensation, factors in the formulas (e.g. region in NL), types of expenditure included, use of high-risk pool

The “risk structure compensation“ (RSC)

- sickness funds = contribution collectors;
- therefore re-distribution of money is more difficult than in all other countries as
- 1. funds look at contributions as “theirs“
- 2. both income of funds and expenditure due to differences in sex, age, morbidity etc. vary.



How does it work?

- Income-side: all wages liable to contributions are summed up across all sickness funds
- Expenditure side: “standardised“ (= average) expenditure is calculated per group of same sex, age and (in)capacity to work; total expenditure is calculated across all groups
- Total expenditure/ total income base = calculated contribution rate for RSC
- Responsible: the Federal Insurance Office



The risk structure mechanism (1998): standardised expenditure/ day (DM)

	Men (West/ East)	Women (West/ East)	Incapacitated men (W/E)	Incapacitated women (W/E)
0 y.	17,34/ 20,08	15,33/ 16,90		
5 y.	3,72/ 4,07	3,01/ 3,26		
20 y.	3,44/ 3,26	5,21/ 4,80		
35 y.	4,59/ 3,98	7,31/ 5,53	53,60/ 23,92	52,32/ 22,13
50 y.	7,99/ 6,52	8,67/ 7,47	35,17/ 29,48	31,88/ 23,72
65 y.	16,78/ 13,88	13,42/ 13,00	32,73/ 30,04	30,25/ 24,48
75 y.	21,08/ 18,57	19,47/ 16,07		
85 y.	25,46/ 20,21	24,05/ 18,71		
90+ y.	28,46/ 19,63	25,52/ 18,19		

x 12

x 8

Differences within age groups are larger than between age groups (and morbidity not captured)!



- Main problem with all risk adjustment formulae: included factors explain only a small part of variation as (costly) morbidity is not captured, *i.e. sickness funds with a high share of chronically ill are disadvantaged!*
- Most innovative approach: to tie risk adjustment to inscription into disease management programmes *– but high administrative hurdles!*



- all SHI systems are traditionally multi-payer/ multi-provider systems – problem 1: weak cost-control
- solutions: budgets – via state (Austria, France) or collective contracts
(problem: contradict competition between funds)
- Opposite approach in the Netherlands: collective contracts will be illegal – but: funds hardly apply selective conditions and reimbursement at lower than maximum rates



- Reimbursement in hospital is changing from per-diem to per-diagnosis (DRG) *– with potential problems for chronically ill!*
- Problem 2: contracts are much easier for acute care than episodes of care for chronically ill
- But: Experiments with GP-led care programmes *(only 15% of French* [illegible] *itation)* and diseas[illegible] *providers' willingness + contracts across sectors!)*

May contradict logic of competition!



- Free access = feature of SHI systems (except NL): Gatekeeping = may be more effective, cheaper, but is also less popular: *in Switzerland, mainly healthy inscribed to GP-led care programmes (for premium rebate) – until the largest insurer, Helsana, terminated contracts last June!*

In conclusion,

- SHI systems have survived a long time incl. wars, mega-inflations, political transformations - and remain popular with the citizens.
- However, they are facing mounting problems, partly due to a imbalanced income/ expenditure base, partly due to the relatively weak stewardship role for government.
- Sickness funds should be (and usually are) accountable, but only to their insured and regarding the benefits covered (i.e. no broad public health perspective).
- In this conflict, “more government“, “competition“ and “special focus to provide continuous care for chronically ill“ are used – but the latter two often contradict each other!

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

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