

European health care systems in transition


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(WHO Collaborating Centre for Health Systems Research and Management)
&

European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies





Third-party Payer







Population

Providers











Tax-based systems in western Europe





<http://mig.tu-berlin.de>

Classical integrated NHS-type system



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Development 2

~~Central~~ **Regional** governments

Questions arising:

- Funding from national or regional taxation?
- Benefit catalogue uniform?
- Supply density and quality regulated uniformly?
- Access to services across regional borders?

Population *Limited choice* Public providers

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Development 3

Regional governments

*General
taxation*

*Purchaser –
provider
split*


Population ~~Limited~~ *more choice* Public providers
(money follows patient)

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Development 4


Regional governments



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
Social Health Insurance or "Bismarckian" countries in western Europe



What makes a health system a SHI system?

Contribution collector **Third-party payer**

Not (health) risk-, but usually wage-related contribution



Population

Providers

CAVE: Many tax-funded systems have high indirect taxes = regressive!

progressive = equitable = „good“

proportional = „not so good“

Direct tax

SHI contribution

regressive = not equitable = „bad“

↑
health funding


income →

Private insurance premium; user fee

SHI systems have (CH) or will (NL) replace contributions by premiums = regressive!

	Distribution: fairness in financial contribution (1.00 = max.)	Threshold		
		% of households with catastrophic payments (total expenditure)	% of households with catastrophic payments (out of pocket)	
1993	Slovakia	0.941	0.00	0.00
	United Kingdom	0.921	0.33	0.04
	Denmark	0.920	0.38	0.07
	Sweden	0.920	0.39	0.18
SHI	Germany	0.913	0.54	0.03
	Hungary	0.905	0.96	0.20
1999 →	Czech Republic	0.904	0.01	0.00
SHI	Belgium	0.903	0.23	0.09
	Finland	0.901	1.36	0.44
	Spain	0.899	0.89	0.48
	Slovenia	0.890	1.88	0.06
SHI	France	0.889	0.68	0.01
	Lithuania	0.875	1.68	1.34
	Switzerland	0.875	3.03	0.57
	Estonia	0.872	2.47	1.30
	Greece	0.858	3.29	2.17
	Portugal	0.845	4.01	2.71
	Latvia	0.828	4.05	2.75

Data: Murray & Evans, "Health Systems Performance Assessment: Debates, Methods and Empiricism", WHO 2003: 525-6



Principal organisational forms of sickness funds

- One national monopoly fund:
e.g. Estonia, Hungary, Poland
- Several regional monopoly funds: *e.g. Latvia, Romania; initially Estonia and Poland*
- Several non-choice funds organised on other principles (e.g. occupation):
Austria, France, Luxembourg; Germany -1995
- Several funds with choice/ competition:
Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland; Czech Republic, Slovakia

More than one fund raises many questions:

- Uniform benefit catalogue?
For equity reasons – yes; but for competition?
- Uniform contribution rate (or per capita premium)?
A, B, F, L = yes; CH, D = no, NL = mix
- If rate is uniform, should there be one collector?
How should the money be allocated to funds?
Which risk factors? What happens if that is not enough? Otherwise: re-allocation between funds needed (as in CH & D)!
- Is it worth it to have more than one fund???


Transferred money through “risk structure compensation“

	West		East		Germany		RSC as % of SHI
	RSC / SHI expenditure ^a (billion €)	RSC as % of SHI	RSC / SHI expenditure ^a (billion €)	RSC as % of SHI	RSC / SHI expenditure ^a (billion €)	RSC as % of SHI	
1995	6.90/ 97.29	7.1	2.36/ 19.70	12.0	9.23/ 116.99	7.9	
1996	7.27/ 100.41	7.2	2.51/ 20.47	12.3	9.78/ 120.88	8.1	
1997	7.71/ 98.23	7.8	2.63/ 20.05	13.1	10.34/ 118.29	8.7	
1998	8.22/ 99.74	8.2	2.80/ 19.97	14.0	11.01/ 119.71	9.2	
1999	8.30/ 102.68	8.1	3.29/ 20.52	16.0	11.60/ 123.21	9.4	
2000	8.30/ 105.05	7.9	3.73/ 20.89	17.8	12.03/ 125.94	9.6	
2001	9.09/ 108.89	8.3	4.43/ 21.75	20.4	13.52/ 130.63	10.3	
2002	9.28/ 111.79	8.3	4.66/ 22.54	20.7	13.94/ 134.33	10.4	
2003	9.87/ 113.14	8.7	4.93/ 23.08	21.4	14.79/ 136.22	10.9	

Source: own calculations based on Ministry of Health and Social Security (27).

Note: RSC: risk structure compensation; ^a total expenditure of sickness funds without spending on administration and fund-specific benefits as detailed in the funds' articles (ca. 90% of total).

What makes a health system a SHI system?



The diagram shows a blue triangle representing the relationship between four entities in a Social Health Insurance (SHI) system. At the top left is 'Contribution collector' and at the top right is 'Payer'. At the bottom left is 'Insured' (circled in red) and at the bottom right is 'Provider'. Lines connect 'Contribution collector' to 'Insured', 'Contribution collector' to 'Payer', 'Payer' to 'Provider', and 'Insured' to 'Provider'.

- SHI traditionally tied to employment
- later extended to defined other groups (dependents, pensioners, unemployed, students, self-employed etc.)
- no exclusion due to health status, but
- notion of “universal coverage“ = very recent phenomenon

The diagram is identical to the one above, showing the relationships between Contribution collector, Payer, Insured, and Provider.

- Universal population coverage in Switzerland (since 1996), Belgium (since 1998), France (since 2000) and in Netherlands (from 2006)
- 75% mandatory and 13% voluntary coverage in Germany (choice between SHI and PHI)
- Currently, 65% coverage in Netherlands (no choice!)

In Germany discussed in 2003 – 120 years after SHI introduction!


Stewardship and accountability



- Stewardship role for government complicated as major health care responsibilities are in the hands of sickness funds
- Sickness funds should be (and usually are) accountable, but only to their insured and regarding the benefits covered (i.e. no broad public health perspective)



What does this all mean?



- Social health insurance systems with more than sickness fund are close to the actors but complicated to steer and manage!
- We do not have convincing data that it's really worth it in terms of improved health outcomes – especially for the chronically ill who need coordinated/ integrated care (disease management programmes) more than competition!

Choice for individuals or collective participation?









Competition

What makes a health system a SHI system?

Contribution collector

Not (health) risk-, but usually wage-related contribution
- *separate from taxes*

Health expenditure visible; population willing to pay more

Third-party payer = sickness funds

Sole raison d'être: to ensure health care as efficient (cost per quality) and responsive as possible

Population

Mandatory insurance

Providers

Ability to pay

Solidarity

Need

What makes a health system a SHI system?

Contribution collector **Third-party payer**
= sickness funds

Not (health) risk-, but usually wage-related contribution

Contracts – to avoid high transaction costs and to ensure equal access: *collective*

Population
Mandatory insurance

Providers
Public-private mix

Who competes for whom?

Contribution collector **Third-party payer**
= sickness funds



Not (health) risk-, but usually wage-related contribution

Contracts

Population
Mandatory insurance

Free access



Providers
Public-private mix



1. Does it work, i.e. does selective contracting/ application of Managed Care instruments produce better outcomes and/or lower costs?
2. For which persons/ indications does it work? For the 75-80% chronically healthy? For the 5% really ill? For the 15-20% chronically ill?

1. -
2. -
3. Does it have adverse effects on somebody else's access?
4. Is it financially successful because of cream-skimming?
5. Is it quality-wise so successful that it leads to adverse selection?

Can risk-adjustment balance both cream-skimming and adverse selection?



1. Assuming it works – i.e. there are more benefits than harm, and assuming risk-adjustment can get us over the negative aspects – , who should benefit?
2. Is it worth it? Do we need less competition (unite sickness funds)? More self-responsibility?

**Public and private health services:
can they co-exist effectively?**

What a question ...
if you come from a country like this:

- Ambulatory care, dental care, pharmacies: >99% private delivery
- Acute care beds: 53% public, 38% not-for-profit, 9% private for profit
- Rehabilitative beds: 17% public, 16% not-for-profit, 67% private for profit
- Nursing home beds: 11% public, 62% not-for-profit, 28% private for profit

Development of the public-private mix in ownership of general hospitals, 1990–2003

	Public		Not-for-profit		Private		Total beds
	beds	% share	beds	% share	beds	% share	
1990	387 207	62.8	206 936	33.5	22 779	3.7	616 922
2003	265 520	53.1	187 271	37.5	46 994	9.4	499 785
Change	-32.4%		-9.5%		+106.2%		-19.0%

Source: own calculations based on Federal Statistical Office 2004 (9;52).

However, the debate is often ...



- Biased
- Confused by inconsistent terminology
- Missing concepts (and therefore data)
- Prejudice & Ideology (in both directions)

The European Observatory's aim is to provide evidence, not ready-made solutions ...



What is public, what is private?

			Funding		
			"public"		"private"
			pub-lic	Statutory Health Insurance	private insurance, out-of-pocket
Deli-very	"pub-lic"	public			
	"pri-vate"	not-for-profit for profit			



Private financing of health care and financial fairness		
	% of private finance of total health care expenditure	
	2002	1990
Greece	47.1	46.3
Switzerland	42.1	47.6
Austria	30.1	26.5
Portugal	29.5	34.5
Belgium	28.8	n.a.
Spain	28.6	21.3
Poland	27.6	8.3
Netherlands	26.7	32.9
Italy	24.4	20.7
Finland	24.3	19.1
France	24.0	23.4
Germany	21.5	23.8
Denmark	16.9	17.3
United Kingdom	16.6	16.4
Norway	14.7	17.2
Sweden	14.7	10.1
Slovakia	10.9	n.a.
Czech Republic	8.6	2.6

Sources: OECD Health Data, first ed. 2004, WHO Health for All Data base 2004, Murray & Evans 2003: pp. 525-6

Private financing of health care and financial fairness					
	% of private finance of total health care expenditure		Fairness in financing (max. 1.00)	% of households which spend >40% of income on health	% of households which spend >40% of income on health out-of-pocket
	2002	1990			
Greece	47.1	46.3	0.858	3.29	2.17
Switzerland	42.1	47.6	0.875	3.03	0.57
Austria	30.1	26.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Portugal	29.5	34.5	0.845	4.01	2.71
Belgium	28.8	n.a.	0.903	0.23	0.09
Spain	28.6	21.3	0.899	0.89	0.48
Poland	27.6	8.3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Netherlands	26.7	32.9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Italy	24.4	20.7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Finland	24.3	19.1	0.901	1.36	0.44
France	24.0	23.4	0.889	0.68	0.01
Germany	21.5	23.8	0.913	0.54	0.03
Denmark	16.9	17.3	0.920	0.38	0.07
United Kingdom	16.6	16.4	0.921	0.33	0.04
Norway	14.7	17.2	0.888	1.22	0.28
Sweden	14.7	10.1	0.920	0.39	0.18
Slovakia	10.9	n.a.	0.941	0.00	0.00
Czech Republic	8.6	2.6	0.904	0.01	0.00

Sources: OECD Health Data, first ed. 2004, WHO Health for All Data base 2004, Murray & Evans 2003: pp. 525-6

Public-private ownership of acute care hospital beds in SHI countries

	Public	Not-for-profit	For profit
Austria	69%	26%	5%
Belgium	60%	40%	
France	65%	15%	20%
Germany	53%	38%	9%
Luxembourg	50%	50%	
Netherlands	14%	86%	

But reality is more complex:

- public hospitals encompass wide range from “budgetary” via „autonomous“ to „corporatized“
- public hospitals may be under public or private law
- public autonomous = private not-for-profit?
- what about “public enterprises“ with partly private ownership?
- big differences between contracted and other private for-profit hospitals

What differentiates public from private (if not ownership per se)?


	Core public bureaucracy		Private organization
Autonomy	Few decision rights	→	Full autonomy
Market exposure	None	→	At full risk for performance
Residual claimant	Public purse	→	Organization
Accountability	Hierarchical direct control	→	Regulation and contracting
Social functions	Unfunded mandate	→	Explicitly funded mandate



Which system is “best“?

Answer depends on goals, i.e.


- Health gain/ improvement
- Responsiveness to population needs
- Sustainable funding
- Equity in health, responsiveness and funding
- Efficiency (reaching goals : resources)

Health gain/ improvement








Birthweight specific infant mortality: Czech Republic




Koupilová, McKee & Holčík. Health Policy, 1998

Life expectancy at age 65, in years









Responsiveness/ satisfaction

**Levels of Choice (Inpatient) , WHO 2000-2001 Survey
World Standardised Population Distribution**



**Levels of Choice (Outpatient) , WHO 2000-2001 Survey
World Standardised Population Distribution**






Figure 1 Delivery Deficit

Difference between what people want from healthcare and what they get

Stockholm Network 2005




Figure 2 Inferiority Complex

How do other European health systems perform compared with your own?

Stockholm Network 2005




Figure 5 Travel for treatment


Would you travel abroad for treatment if your health system paid?



Stockholm Network 2005

Reforms most likely to increase the quality of care			
	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Not likely</i>	<i>Net</i>
Giving patients more information about their illness	76	21	55
Increasing number of medicines and treatments	67	29	38
Giving patients more control over public spending on health	67	30	37
Making it easier for patients to spend their own money on health	66	30	36
Increasing range of doctors and hospitals	43	53	-10



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Sustainable funding






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


Equity



Health Financing Contribution Distribution Graph




Czech Republic
Level for Choice by sex and age categories (Outpatient)



Efficiency?





If asked, the public wants reforms in every country – but which?

Figure 4 Reform Index
Does your healthcare system need reforming?

Stockholm Network 2005

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